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Abstract
In spite of the movement to turn political science into a real science, various math-
ematical methods that are now the staples of physics, biology, and even economics are
thoroughly uncommon in political science, especially the study of civil war. This study
seeks to apply such methods - specifically, ordinary differential equations (ODEs) - to
model civil war based on what one might dub the capabilities school of thought, which
roughly states that civil wars end only when one side’s ability to make war falls far
enough to make peace truly attractive. I construct several different ODE-based models
and then test them all to see which best predicts the instantaneous capabilities of both
sides of the Sri Lankan civil war in the period from 1990 to 1994 given parameters and
initial conditions.
The model that the tests declare most accurate gives very accurate predictions of
state military capabilities and reasonable short term predictions of cumulative deaths.
Analysis of the model reveals the scale of the importance of rebel finances to the sustain-
ability of insurgency, most notably that the number of troops required to put down the
Tamil Tigers is reduced by nearly a full order of magnitude when Tiger foreign funding
is stopped. The study thus demonstrates that accurate foresight may come of relatively
simple dynamical models, and implies the great potential of advanced and currently
unconventional non-statistical mathematical methods in political science.
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Exposition
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It was, and perhaps still is, the largest and deadliest war that the world has never
heard of. The Second Congolese War, the deadliest war since World War II, nonetheless
remains obscure in the public mind (assuming it ever made it there in the first place)
simply because it seemed like a Congolese affair rather than an international affair -
merely a civil war. But the death count, unparalleled in decades, and the covert but
sinister hands of various foreign actors made clear that in this modern age, war is never
only a Congolese affair or a Rwandan affair or an Afghan affair.
Political scientists have recognized this fact, and thus the study of civil war is in
no ways lacking for literature. Several explanations for their incidence and duration,
ranging from the nearly genetic to the wholly economic, have arisen to explain why
civil wars begin and, to a lesser extent, why they end. Unfortunately, unlike some of the
generals and rebel leaders studied, the field of political science has not gone to all lengths
or sought all means to achieve its goals. An entire field of techniques - mathematical
6
methods based largely on calculus - has gone neglected.
Aside from their common tendency to stir unpleasant feelings in the general public,
civil wars and calculus seem largely unrelated. In spite of the movement to turn political
science into a real science, various mathematical methods that are now the staples of
physics, biology, and even economics are thoroughly uncommon in political science,
especially the study of civil war. This study seeks to apply such methods - specifically,
ordinary differential equations - to model what I dub the capabilities hypothesis of civil
war, which roughly states that civil wars end only when one side’s ability to make war
falls far enough to make peace truly attractive. I construct several different ODE-based
models and then test them all to see which best predicts the capabilities of both sides
of a civil war at any given time point. Aside from producing a tool that could prove
invaluable in the study of civil war, this study seeks more importantly to demonstrate the
usefulness of more advanced and currently unconventional non-statistical mathematical
methods in political science.
After testing the different models, I find that the best of them makes surprisingly
accurate extrapolations of government troop levels and decent predictions of total cumu-
lative death counts while overestimating rebel numbers. Analysis of the model reveals
the scale of the importance of foreign funding and weapon costs to the rebel cause. The
end conclusion is that the methods explored here have great potential and merit further
investigation.
This paper is divided into several parts. After reviewing the literature, the criterion
by which the model candidates will be evaluated will be explained in the research design.
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The different models are presented and justified in the next section. Then I detail the
results of assessing the various different models against actual data from a period of the
Sri Lankan civil war. I then analyze the most successful of these models to wring from
it whatever counterfactual insight about Sri Lanka’s war is possible. Finally, I discuss
the limitations of the results and what broader conclusions one may draw.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Why Men Think
Men Rebel
2.1 The Incidence of Civil War
2.1.1 Grievance
The common theme across the many different schools falling under the category of
“grievance” is not far removed from common sense: people fight because they dislike or
are angry with one another. From this most basic of principles, a vast variety of theories
has sprung up to contend for the ultimate prize of causal explanatory power.
The primordialist school of thought puts primary emphasis on culture and ethnicity.
Essentially constructivist in its analysis, this school argues that strife, both internal and
external, are almost inevitable because the process of creating a sense of ethnicity and
9
belonging toward one’s own group inevitably entails creating a sense of foreignness and
un-belonging to other groups. This mistrust of the other, part of one’s “primordial at-
tachments,” is very difficult for the individual to shake and “will provide ethnic conflicts
with their seemingly intractable nature” (Stack, 1997, 17). Primordialists are quick to
add that “Differences do not necessarily mean conflict,” but this nonetheless does not
prevent cultural differences from becoming “the battle lines of the future” (Huntington,
1993, 22). Aside from the primordialists’ highly deterministic prescription of war, and
also Huntington’s arbitrary delineation of “civilizations” that may or may not actually
exist (not to mention his uncertainty about the existence of African civilization), one can
question the actual explanatory power of fractionalization. For example, while Hunt-
ington paints the India-Pakistan conflict as a battle between “Hindu” and “Muslim”
civilizations, he does not account for why once removed from the subcontinent to, say,
the United States, former Pakistanis and former Indians do not spontaneously erupt
into violent conflict. Furthermore, statistical analyses have found that ethnic fractional-
ization is only associated with greater risk of civil war when one has a dominant group
versus a relatively large minority (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).
Such implies that ethnicity alone is not the overarching cause of violence.
For reasons similar to these, other scholars of grievance have chosen instead to ex-
amine grievances generated through more current government or majority actions. The
most famous of these theories is Ted Gurr’s model of relative deprivation, which states
that civil strife occurs when the values alloted to people by government fall short of
their expectations. Stated most precisely in (Gurr, 1968), the operationalized version
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of the theory is that the dependent variable, namely the magnitude of civil strife, is a
function of the independent variable relative deprivation as altered by several intermedi-
ate variables. Thus, while deprivation is not the sole variable governing the outbreak of
violence, it is the original cause that makes other variables such as the coercive potential
of authorities and the legitimacy of the regime relevant.
Other scholars have looked at grievance on a more personal level. Miranda Alison,
for example, while interviewing women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Alison,
2003), did indeed find “conventional” grievances liberally strewn in the rhetoric of rebel
leaders, most notably nationalism. However, she notes that these national sentiments
are stated almost to hide the real and far more personal reasons for enlistment and
insurrection: personal losses at the hands of overzealous/indiscriminate government
counterinsurgency and the disruption of one’s education. While the example of India’s
actions in Kashmir, for example, certainly seem to vouch for the importance of personal
grievance in analyzing civil war, one rarely has vicious counterinsurgency operations
unless one has an insurgency to begin with, so the question of why civil war breaks out
in the first place remains unanswered.
Psychologists studying terrorism have theorized that not just any grievance, but
humiliation specifically, is the root cause of civil war. Evelin Lindner writes that con-
sidering the devastating effect humiliation can have on personal relationships, mass
humiliation of entire ethnic, racial, religious, or class groups can destroy the bonds that
keep society cohesive and peaceful (Lindner, 2001). Noting that deprivation alone is
not enough to explain rebellion because deprivation is common while rebellion is not,
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she theorizes that humiliation is the catalyst that transmutes deprivation into violence.
Though this theory does account for the presence of more educated and wealthy indi-
viduals in the ranks of rebel organizations, it does not address the question of why then
the overwhelming majority of militants in the world are from the lower classes (Stern,
2003). Furthermore, considering that most civil wars occur in the poorest parts of the
developing world (Collier et al., 2003), one is forced to wonder why oppressed minorities
in the less developed countries (LDCs) feel so much more humiliated than their post-
industrialized counterparts.
2.1.2 Greed/Opportunity
What is still often called the greed explanation for civil war is now generally divided into
two markedly different hypotheses for why civil war occurs. Both are still distinguishable
from the grievance theories because of their emphasis on civil war as an option rather
than a last resort, and both are more concerned with material factors than psychological
and social factors. Furthermore, both state that since grievances, some very severe, exist
in every society but civil wars do not, that discontent cannot be the most important
explanatory variable in civil war incidence. However, even when they cite the same
variables as those most important in predicting the outbreak of civil war, they give very
different reasons for the importance of these variables.
The greed school of thought was quite novel when it first appeared because it focused
on the lucrativeness of civil war for a select and brutal few. Civil war, much like the
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sale of a trendy new product, is more likely to occur wherever and whenever it is most
profitable. Deeply rooted in the rational choice model as the theory is, one should not
be surprised to see that it employs the language and techniques of economics to explain
why civil wars break out. Indeed, Collier and Hoeffler actually write utility functions
examining the difference between the potential gain from control of tax revenues and/or
from natural resources and the inevitable cost of war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Thus,
while for example the presence of concentrated natural resources in an area creates a
very strong incentive for the inhabitants of said area to rebel, a high gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita raises the opportunity cost of war (because living peacefully
is more profitable) and thus decreases the incentive to rebel. The problem with this
thesis, however, is that aside from the possibility that most of the variables analyzed
might support the opportunity hypothesis over the greed hypothesis (and some the
grievance hypothesis as well), more recent evidence has cast doubt on several of the
variables analyzed here. Indeed, it is a clear indication that the authors’ N was not
large enough that six years later, they cast serious doubt on their own natural resource
hypothesis using larger data sets and different methods (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).
Some consider the opportunity school of thought as simply a more watered-down
version of greed, and the fact that the same people who invented the greed theory
then years later introduced the opportunity theory in response to criticism does not
help this impression. While I concede freely that opportunity was derived from the
same basic principles (and perhaps the same basic statistical regressions) as greed, I
still classify it separately because it provides different causal explanations using those
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principles. Stated tersely, the opportunity hypothesis theorizes that rebellions are most
likely to break out wherever rebellion is most possible. In this analytic perspective,
per capita GDP is still a central variable as in the greed theory, but now rather than
representing an opportunity cost as rebels’ lost income, it is instead an actual cost
made inevitable because of the need to feed and equip soldiers. New variables take on
importance, such as total GDP, which is a measure of the government’s financial base
in fighting rebels. Perhaps most indicative of this school’s results is the consistent and
statistically significant correlation between mountainous terrain and civil war incidence
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). But while statistics certainly do
show the importance of the variables named in this theory, simple logic casts doubt on
their causal power. Certainly, a rebellion is more likely continue and/or succeed if the
rebels have access to the resources they need to fight, but this hardly implies that the
reason for their seeking resources is their very existence. Indeed, the proposition that
people risk their lives taking up arms simply because they have access to those arms
is questionable, to say the least. Thus, separated from its greed roots, the opportunity
theory carries predictive power without any real explanatory power. Ergo, one is forced
to conclude that the undeniable importance of opportunity only becomes relevant after
the outbreak of war.
2.2 The Dynamics of Civil War
Much thought and ink have been invested in the analysis of the outbreak of civil war, yet
until recently, surprisingly little was spent on the study of civil war duration, outcome,
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and intensity. Perhaps due to the obvious policy relevance of the study of civil war,
especially for organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations, researchers
understandably reasoned that the durations of civil wars would be irrelevant if precise
means of preventing their outbreak could be identified. Unfortunately, even events as
brutally spectacular as wars carry their subtleties, and thus none of the explanations
outlined above have been definitively substantiated or even definitively debunked.
However, the analysis of civil war dynamics, or at least civil war duration, intensity,
and outcome provides those concerned with civil war policy a new approach. Taking
the incidence of civil war as given for whatever reason, be it humiliation or greedy
ringleaders, one can then focus on what exactly makes for a Black September (a month
long uprising in Jordan) versus a Second Congolese War (the deadliest war since World
War II). If the duration and intensity of civil war can be minimized, then the damage
they do to economics, infrastructure, and innocent bystanders can also be minimized.
Delineating broad schools of thought on the dynamics of civil war is more awkward
than doing so for civil war incidence, but I feel that because the factors that cause
a civil war in the first place must have some link to the factors that prolong it, the
easiest way to classify different ideas is by simply extending the schools of civil war
incidence into the realm of dynamics. At times, the fit of thought to school is uncom-
fortable at best, but the only alternative is to list every individual hypothesis separately.
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2.2.1 Grievance
Grievance theories are difficult to translate from incidence to dynamics and even harder
to analyze, which may be why so few appear in the most current literature. However,
several of the incidence theories themselves did not apply exclusively to war incidence,
so it is worthwhile to consider how they thus relate to civil war duration and intensity.
The argument about humiliation (Lindner, 2001) implies that as long as the source
of humiliation persists, or as long as new sources of humiliation (such as a repressive
government response to violent discontent) present themselves, insurgency will continue.
Meanwhile, the idea of personal grievances summarized above (Alison, 2003) - that
gung ho government responses to rebellion that leave too many innocents dead or too
many lives disrupted will only create new militants for the government to fight - seems
naturally to relate better to civil war duration than to civil war incidence. Examples
such as the Indian government’s perceived brutality in Kashmir and that conflict’s al-
tered nature over the past few decades certainly lend credence to this idea. However,
while both grievance arguments explain why people might be motivated to continue
fighting the government after war has begun, they are silent on exactly how these indi-
viduals convert rage into something beyond thrown stones and soiled public bathrooms.
2.2.2 Greed
For this reason, much of recent civil war dynamics literature has focused on more eco-
nomic factors in hopes of discovering the secret of civil war duration in what one might
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call the stock market of war. The arguments that I classify as greed-based all relate to
the literal profitability of war - war will continue as long as certain interests, be they
the principal actors or other influential parties, either gain or expect to gain. Winslow
and Woost describe how in the case of Sri Lanka, a new economy has evolved around
the decades-old war and has created a new breed of entrepreneur that profits off of strife
(Winslow and Woost, 2004). A perfect example is the actions of the marketing divisions
of various clever firms, which have put down money to sponsor military checkpoints
in return for advertising space in a spot where people will be forced to wait for hours
(Richardson, 2005).
A theory called war-as-investment (Collier et al., 2004) also falls into this category.
Very similar to the incidence version of greed, it states that rebels fight for future gain -
be it in the form of cash or freedom from repressive/discriminatory laws - and are willing
to suffer costs in the short term as a result. Thus, as long as the costs of war do not come
to overwhelm the benefits of victory, the rebels will continue to fight. However, aside
from the lack of evidence Collier et al. found to support this hypothesis (2004), all of
the hypotheses suffer from the same problem as the grievance explanations: explaining
motives without explaining means. Since the overwhelming majority of civil wars do not
end in settlement, but rather when one side crushes the other, this seems like a rather
awkward omission.
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2.2.3 Capabilities
The dynamical version of the opportunity school is the capabilities school. All theories
in this school imply that civil war will continue as long as both sides are capable of
continuing it. Since the occurrence of a civil war is now a given, the main problem that
plagued the opportunity school of thought - namely, that the ability to rebel cannot be
the only reason why people rebel - is no longer an issue. Indeed, Stern (2003) finds in
her interviews with terrorists and other militants that while most of them were drawn to
their respective causes due to personal grievances, nationalist sentiments, or other such
psychological issues, that once involved in the struggle, they became career militants.
Indeed, often after fighting in one uprising, a militant will simply move on to a different
conflict about which he or she feels much less passionately in the pursuit of a paycheck
(Stern, 2003), bringing new meaning to the expression rebel without a cause.
Collier et al. (2004) outline a war-as-business argument which states that a war,
much like a daring entrepreneurial venture, will last only so long as it remains profitable.
This is different from the war-as-investment theory because it focuses on present profit
rather than expectancy of future profit. Phrased differently, a rebel organization must
pay its bills somehow, and the rebellion will continue as long as it can continue to do
so. Though this can take a form very similar to the greed-based theories outlined above
when formulated such that rebels are literally reaping profit from the war itself, its
authors treat it more as though rebellions span as long as their finances (Collier et al.,
2004). Findings such as the existence of higher risk of civil war in countries with low per
capita GDPs may support this theory (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler,
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2004). Furthermore, the discovery that periods of low primary commodity prices (often
a source of rebel funds) coincide with periods of peace-making grant it more certain
substantiation (Collier et al., 2004). Collier et al. suggest in the same paper a theory
called war-by-mistake, which states that civil wars occur because both the state and the
rebels are overly optimistic about their hopes of success and civil wars will continue as
long as such delusions persist (Collier et al., 2004). While they pose this as a completely
different theory, I believe that since the two sides’ misperceptions are inevitably about
their own or enemy capabilities that it best belongs as an addition to the war-as-business
model.
Other scholars have studied the role of foreign funding with respect to the rebels’
capabilities. Various studies have found that external intervention’s effect on civil war
duration is rarely good (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline,
2000), especially when the intervener takes the side of the rebels and thus reduces
the costs of waging war. Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) actually disaggregate
interventions into neutral third parties and third parties who are rivals of the war-
torn state’s government, and find that even the expectation of a rival’s intervention
(especially economic intervention) will increase the duration of a civil war because the
rebels will fight on even as their wallets grow hollow in the hopes of eventual foreign
backing (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2005).
Finally, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) look at the capabilities issue from the other
side, examining state capabilities. They theorize that capable state apparatus is most
important in deciding a war on the side of the government, and find among other things
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that one of the deadliest blows to a rebellion’s hopes of success is an effective state
bureaucracy (DeRouen Jr. and Sobek, 2004).
2.3 Dynamical Models
The literature does not exactly abound with models based on ordinary differential equa-
tion - indeed, the study of civil war, like most of political science scholarship, relies
largely on statistics rather than dynamics. The difference between the two approaches
is that statistical methods are generally inductive in their approach whereas dynamical
methods are deductive. Both are important, and neither alone will provide a complete
picture of civil war and peace; thus, the present scarcity of dynamical models is trou-
bling. However, a dearth is not a void, and the one model I have found - that of Allan
and Stahel (1983) - is certainly worth discussing.
Unlike the model I propose here, Allan and Stahel’s model was custom tailored to
fit exactly one case - the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - and was created for predictive
rather than analytic purposes. In some ways, the model is more a reflection of Cold War-
era beliefs about superpowers than anything. For example, the model is constructed such
that the Soviet Union cannot possibly lose. Indeed, considering the rather cataclysmic
consequences of the war, some would probably say Allan and Stahel’s model was a
complete failure. However, one should recall that the CIA itself could not predict the fall
of the Soviet Union and thus it seems rather absurd to expect five differential equations
to somehow do just that.
Leaving aside the rather unpredictable outcome of the whole affair, the model re-
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vealed despite its heavy Soviet-tilt that, contrary to expectations that the U.S.S.R. and
its Afghan allies would crush the mujahidiin with little difficulty, the Soviets would take
huge losses even using the most conservative of parameter values. Indeed, their exact
words about Soviet losses are “Numbering 48,000 over the six years, they are compara-
ble to U.S. losses in Vietnam” (Allan and Stahel, 1983, 600). They go on to emphasize
the potential longevity of the struggle, the difficulty of outright Soviet victory, and the
inevitably huge cost that will be exacted upon the Afghan people. Considering that this
article was published in 1983, and considering the eventual outcome of the war, one can
see that even when imperfectly formulated, dynamical models have an eerie power all
their own.
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Chapter 3
Research Design: Experiments in
War and Peace
Short of being on the battlefield and/or within the ranks of the rebels, something that
requires a dedication to science slightly beyond what most analysts possess, testing the
capabilities hypothesis of civil war is difficult. Certainly, fine work has been done in
spite of the difficulties of obtaining all such data that one could want, but dealing with
counter-factuality requires instantaneous knowledge of classified information. How can
one know precisely how many troops the state has at a given moment? How can one
know precisely how many troops the rebels have at any time point, much less at every
time point?
Mindful of how most political scientists will share my own unwillingness to wander
a battlefield in search of data, I thus set out to construct the next best thing: a math-
ematical model that when given accurate initial conditions and parameter values will
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predict the troop counts of both the state and the rebels at any given time point (with
certain restrictions to be outlined). To do so, I will present several potential models
and test all of them against data from a segment of the Sri Lankan civil war to see
which is the best predictor of outcomes. However, before testing anything, it would be
prudent to set down concretely the criteria for evaluation, the case to be examined, and
the sources for all data.
3.1 Criteria
To evaluate the performance of each model in each case, I employ five measures of
accuracy.
1. Troop Levels and GDP (SSerr
SStot
) - Using (where available) actual data for yearly
state and rebel troop levels and GDP, I take a sum of differences squared between
observed and expected values for each variable and divide by the variance of the
the data for said variable. One should avoid the temptation to think of the result
as 1− R2, where R2 is the coefficient of determination, because these models are
not fitted (in the sense of least square regressions) to the data, so one could very
well have error terms larger than one, resulting in an “R2” that is negative, which
makes absolutely no sense. Note that both the individual error terms that result
and their sum will be compared between models.
2. Yearly Combat Deaths (SSerr
SStot
) - Much as for yearly troop levels, yearly combat
deaths, both total and disaggregated into state, rebel, and civilian, will be sub-
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jected to an observed-expected sum of squares of differences over variance.
3. Cumulative Combat Deaths (SSerr
SStot
) - This measure is calculated exactly as the
yearly combat deaths measure is, except that cumulative combat deaths up to a
given year are used instead. This measure is included mainly because cumulative
deaths, an increasing function, is expected to be less variable than yearly deaths
and thus a more relaxed indicator of performance.
4. Outcome - The model’s predicted ending state will be qualitatively scored accord-
ing to the following rubric:
4 - Relative difference in capabilities and general dynamics accurate
GDP is higher or lower as expected
3 - Relative difference in capabilities accurate and general dynamics accurate
GDP behavior incorrect
2 - Relative difference in capabilities and general dynamics inaccurate
GDP is higher or lower as expected
1 - Nothing accurate
See Appendix C for more information on what the actual relative difference in
capabilities was scored to be.
5. Civilian Death Estimation - This measure is simply the difference of the observed
and expected total number of civilians killed during the timespan examined divided
by the observed number. A smaller absolute value indicates a better estimator.
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3.2 The Case
Due to the limitations of the models (see Chapter 4), rather than studying an entire
civil war, I instead examine just a segment of a civil war. More specifically, I will use the
Sri Lankan civil war from the departure of the Indian Peacekeeping Force to the peace
talks at the end of 1994. This war during this period fits the assumptions of the model
well because by 1990, the Tamil Tigers have largely eliminated rival militant separatist
groups and the uprising of the communist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna party has been
put down. Civilian deaths, though grim for a tiny island with a population smaller
than that of New York City, are not overwhelming. Furthermore, as the war is largely
concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country, the effects of civilian
displacement are less extreme than otherwise might be the case. Thus, the assumptions
outlined in section 4.1 are largely unviolated. The period studied naturally ends with
the ceasefire and peace negotiations that begin with the arrival of the Kumaratunga
administration, a blatant violation of Model Assumption 3.
3.3 Data
The data and methods used in parameter calculations, as well as to verify the models’
individual accuracies, can be found in Appendices B and C, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Model Development: Constructing
Apocalypse
In this section, I will systematically develop several candidates for the title of ultimate
dynamical model of civil war military capabilities.
4.1 Basic Assumptions
All of the general models that follow will be built upon the following basic principles:
1. (Materialism) A side’s military capabilities are determined solely by material fac-
tors, as opposed to grievance-type issues (morale, etc.)
2. (Dualism) A civil war contains only two opposing sides - those fighting for the
state and those fighting for the rebels
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3. (Zealotry) The two opposing sides will continue to fight until one of them is com-
pletely destroyed
4. (Professionalism) Neither side will kill large numbers of civilians in a manner
wholly independent of combat
5. (Demographic Constancy) Civilian casualties, internally displaced persons, and
refugees do not amount to a sizable proportion of the population
Though the models are technically of military capabilities, because of their in-
herent structure (most notably, military capabilities being affected by casualties),
they are to some extent models of civil war intensity as well. Thus, one may as
well make the following implicit assumption explicit:
6. (Determined Intensity) The intensity of a civil war is determined solely by the two
sides’ military capabilities.
The first three of these assumptions are largely necessitated by the need to keep
the model simple. Modeling the effects of policy grievances and morale, not to mention
how they change over time, would be difficult if not impossible, so materialism must
be assumed. Dualism simply precludes the inevitable complications of additional sides,
namely additional equations and more complicated kill terms that reflect the many
combinations of killer and killed. Finally, as modeling the decisions of leaders to sue for
peace or lay down their arms is well beyond the scope of this model (and perhaps even
ordinary differential equations in general), one must assume zealotry so the model will
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run until one side can fight no more. By observing the sides’ capabilities as predicted by
the model, future research can assign “probabilities of peace” to different relative levels
of capabilities and/or death counts to account for this flaw.
The next two assumptions, however, are somewhat less tenable. The term “pro-
fessional” probably does not apply in any form whatsoever to the average civil war
participant. Indeed, while one might expect soldiers to leave civilians in peace because
they have no weapons, it is in fact for precisely this reason that civilians are almost
never left alone. However, the mere killing of civilians in the course of a war is not an
issue as much as the systematic killing of civilians instead of rather than in addition
to enemy fighters. In other words, terrorist-style attacks or even small massacres would
be acceptable (to use the word loosely), but large-scale and protracted genocide in the
absences of actual combat would not. Meanwhile, the Second Congolese War mentioned
in the introduction was/is not the only civil war where a huge disruption of demograph-
ics was the most obvious facet of the war. It bears noting that at least the assumption
of Demographic Constancy must be dropped and the models altered accordingly should
one wish to adapt them to more cataclysmic civil wars.
The final assumption is to some extent the embodiment of the capabilities hypothesis
itself. As outlined in Chapter 3, to have this hypothesis underpinning all of the models
means that if none of the models carry any validity whatsoever, then the validity of the
capabilities hypothesis itself must be called into question.
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4.2 Developing the Models
The models will be divided into five levels of complexity, where level 1 consists of the
most basic of model equations, and subsequent levels progressively add more depth to
this baseline. The models are labeled in the form [Lineage][Complexity Level].[Version],
where lineage refers to the handling of how rebels kill state troops (see below). As other
terms (most notably, the way the state kills rebels) can lead to further variation, version
number will serve to distinguish these variants.
4.2.1 Level 1: Foundation
The following bare bones model, which will be called A1, is as good a starting point as
any:
dS
dt
= kSc
−1
S (fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= kRc
−1
R (fR + iR1G− xRR)− dRS1RS
dG
dt
= rG
Figure 4.1 summarizes the workings of this model in the form of a component dia-
gram. In the equation for dS
dt
, the expression (fS + iSG − xSS) represents the state’s
net income. The revenue is simply the amount of foreign aid the state receives plus the
product of the gross domestic product and the percent of the GDP spent on the armed
forces, and from this the upkeep expense per soldier times the number of soldiers is sub-
tracted. Of this income, a certain amount inevitably winds up in pockets for which it
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Figure 4.1: Component diagram for level 1 complexity
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was never destined, and thus due to this corruption only a kS proportion of it is actually
available for outfitting the army. The assumptions of materialism and zealotry imply
that all of this remaining income will be spent on war-making, so the corruption-scaled
net income is divided by cS, the cost to train a new soldier, to yield the number of new
troops produced each year. From this, the number of soldiers killed in a year dSRSR is
subtracted. Note that in model A1, the rate at which rebels kill soldiers is modeled with
a simple nonlinear interaction term, implying the number of soldiers killed increases as
the number of soldiers available to be killed and the number of rebels partaking in killing
increases. dR
dt
follows exactly the same reasoning.
Meanwhile, dG
dt
consists of simple proportional growth, implying the state’s GDP will
increase exponentially over time.
These equations yield the following Jacobian matrix:
J =

kSxS
cS
− dSR1R −dSR1S kSiScS
−dRS1R −kRxRcR − dRS1S
kRiR1
cR
0 0 r

If the limitations of this model are not obvious from the equations themselves, then
the Jacobian obligingly drives them home. Other points aside, the country’s gross
domestic product is completely unaffected by the war - indeed, ∂G˙
∂S
= ∂G˙
∂R
= 0. Also
note that the state and rebel equations are basically mirror images of one another - in
other words, structurally speaking, the state and the rebels have parallel capabilities.
In practice, different parameters would ensure the two sides’s capabilities would not
change identically, but this nonetheless assumes that state troops fight and kill in much
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the same way as rebel fighters. The most important point is the kill term dSRSR from
dS
dt
. This basic interaction term is the most intuitive means of describing the rebels’
killing potential, and thus models employing it will fall under the A lineage.
However, an interaction term is not the only means of modeling the rebels’ killing
skills. Indeed, Allan and Stahel’s (1983) model uses a simple linear term to model the
mujahideen’s killing of Soviet and Afghan troops on the justification that such best
models guerrilla hit-and-run tactics (one can imagine on a micro basis that the rebels
emerge from hiding only long enough to each get off a single shot before hiding again).
Such an assumption gives rise to the B lineage of models.
Unfortunately, a direct application of Allan and Stahel’s simple linear formulation
results in a term of the form dSRR. While in their model, such was not a problem as
the number of Soviet troops could never really become very small, in the current model,
it is very possible that S can be small (if the government is on the verge of collapse)
and thus this linear term could force S to be negative, which makes no sense. Thus,
I add a Michaelis-Menten factor S
S+1
. This term is close to 1 for normal values of S,
but becomes substantially less than 1 for S < 5 and rapidly approaches 0 as S → 0.
Thus, this factor ensures soldiers cannot be killed when no soldiers exist to be killed.
Model B1 uses this alternative formulation for rebel killing and thus differs from A1 in
its equation for dS
dt
:
dS
dt
= c−1S (fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR2R
S
S + 1
Note the appearance of the new parameter dSR2, which must be calculated differently
32
from dSR1 due to the structural differences in the two kill terms.
4.2.2 Level 2: Rebel Expense Approximation
Unless a government raid yields meticulously-kept rebel account books and such books
are then released to the public, the exact upkeep expense a rebel organization faces
per fighter can only be ascertained by infiltrating said organization. Preferring not
to risk disembowelment for the sake of a parameter value, I therefore must resort to
approximations.
According to Stern (2003), fighters in a commander-cadre organization (which is
essentially what a coherent rebel organization of the form studied here is) come to treat
militancy as a profession, and thus only fight as long as long as their leaders make it
worth their while. Thus, it seems logical that they will fight only as long as their leaders
at least meet their opportunity cost, as approximated by the state’s median income. As
median income can change throughout the course of a war as GDP is affected, it seems
logical to represent median income as a function of GDP. From this conceptualization,
one can construct models A2 and B2 by updating A1 and B1 respectively with the
following dR
dt
equation:
dR
dt
= c−1R (fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS1RS
where p is the population and qi is the average ratio between per capita GDP and median
income.
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4.2.3 Level 3: Economic Effects of War
In all of the models presented so far, the most serious flaw of A1 - namely, the non-effect
of war on the country’s economy - has remained unaddressed. If one assumes that the
rate at which a country’s economic growth is stymied by war is proportional to the
number of civilians killed, then a scaling of an approximation of civilian deaths per year
will give an approximation of the amount of growth the country loses per year.
By the assumption of professionalism, one can assert that civilians will only die when
caught in the crossfire of battles between the state and the rebels or at least only in
spillover aggression from such battles. Thus, it follows that the number of civilians killed
in a year is proportional to the number of government and rebel troops killed. Ergo,
one can replace the equation for dG
dt
in both A2 and B2 with the following:
dG
dt
= rG− cCG[dCκ(S,R)]
where κ(S,R) is the sum of the state and rebel death terms. Thus, κ(S,R) = dSR1SR+
dRS1RS in model A3, and κ(S,R) = dSR2R
S
S+1
+ dRS1RS in model B3.
4.2.4 Level 4: Dynamic State Killing Ability
Aside from the difficulty of calculating the parameter dRS1 (because data on the total
number of rebels or the number of rebels killed over a long enough span of time needed
to create a truly averaged number are scarce), one can further doubt the validity of
a simple interaction term because the ease with which the state finds and kills rebels
will not be constant throughout the war. As Guevara writes, a rebel organization must
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make survival its main goal in its formative years; however, once it has grown larger
and stronger, it can follow more aggressive tactics and eventually face the state in open
battles (Guevara, 2006).
With these considerations in mind, it seems the best approach may be to think of
the state’s ability to kill rebels throughout the war (not just during battles, but also
during lulls when the rebels are not showing themselves) as a fraction of its ability to
kill the rebels when they do show themselves. Thus, one can think of the term dRS2RS
as the state’s full killing ability (note the new parameter dRS2, which is calculated from
the most intense part of the war), and in each of the variations below, this term is
multiplied by a term reflective of rebel tactics and/or hiding ability.
(1)
dR
dt
= c−1R (iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS R
eS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
(2)
dR
dt
= c−1R (iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS × hR2S
p
(3)
dR
dt
= c−1R (iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS
[
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
]
In equation (1), rebel combat preference and rebel hiding ability are aggregated
into one term. Thus, as the number of state troops increases (hit-and-run seems more
appealing) and as the country’s population size increases (hit-and-run is easier), the
Michaelis-Menten term becomes smaller to reflect more evasive tactics and thus fewer
rebel losses.
In equation (2), it is assumed that the rebels will always prefer guerrilla tactics where
possible and thus the only factor that matters is their ability to practice such tactics.
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Thus, in this formulation, a greater state soldier density (S
p
) leads to more rebel losses
as hiding among the civilian population becomes more difficult.
Finally, equation (3) disaggregates rebel preference from rebel hiding ability by using
separate terms to represent each, the sum of which yields rebel visibility. The first term
ReS
ReS+(S
2
)eS
, which represents rebel preference, is Michaelis-Menten and is designed to
simply equal 1/2 when rebel forces are half the size of the state’s and to approach 1
tangentially as R increases. Meanwhile, the hiding ability term hR3
S
p
is much the same
as in (2).
In all of these equations, it bears emphasis that the term hRx has no simple real-world
meaning (an unfortunate inevitability arising from modeling something as complicated
as guerrilla tactics with so few terms). Thus, the term must be calculated from actual
data from the war under study, and hopefully additional test cases will confirm that
the resulting value is either relatively invariant across cases or follows a pattern that
corresponds to real world conditions.
4.2.5 Level 5: Balance of Power
As a civil war progresses and the rebels become stronger, the territory they protect/terrorize
will expand and thus their income potential will increase while the income potential of
the state decreases. To model this, I use what I dub balance of power terms of the form
S
S+R
, which simply reflect the percentage of the country’s fighters that are loyal to one
side or the other (and thus reflect the relative amount of force either side has with which
to extract taxes or protection fees, etc.). This struggle for the country’s tax base is best
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Figure 4.2: State control of tax base in case of no war (state has monopoly on force)
and intense war (25% of force is rebel)
depicted in diagram 4.2.
The result is several new level 5 models, all exactly like their level 4 equivalents but
where the income terms iSG and iRG are replaced with iSG
S
S+R
and iR2G
R
S+R
, respec-
tively. In this new formulation, iS and iR2 come to represent the desired (perhaps wishful
is the best word) rate at which either side can extract resources from the population - in
other words, the rate at which either side would milk the populace if it did indeed have
a monopoly on force in the country. It is important to note the new parameter iR2, the
proportion the rebels want, and iR1, what they actually get, are vastly different quan-
tities. Meanwhile, in the case of the state, such would probably not change immensely
because iS is calculated from data where the state is largely in control.
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Part II
Results
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Chapter 5
Model Evaluation: Model Warfare
5.1 Criteria Scores
The results, as gauged by the criteria set out in Section 3.1, are outlined in Tables 5.1
and 5.2, with the “winning” value in each category bolded. Note that models A5.1,
A5.2, A5.3, and B5.2 are immediately disqualified from further consideration because of
their substandard Outcome scores, and models B5.1 and B5.3 are similarly disqualified
for the even more blatant failing of causing Matlab to crash when I attempted to run
them (hence the blank entries for all of their criteria scores).
Looking at the criteria, one can see that no model exactly swept the polls, so to speak
(except when compared to the level 5 models, which did not make it onto the ballot).
Indeed, the battle appears to be a tie between model A3 and model B4.2, the latter
taking the gold in estimating troop levels and the former claiming victory in predicting
deaths. However, considering that A3’s error in predicting troop levels is somewhat
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less than B4.2’s error in predicting death counts (either yearly or cumulative), one can
tentatively declare A3 the winner.
This victory is surprising for many reasons, not the least of which is that A3 is
much simpler in logic and form than most of the others. However, it should not be too
triumphantly celebrated. As plates a and b of Figure 5.1 makes clear, the qualitative
behaviors of the levels 2 to 4 models are not very different. Furthermore, one should not
put too much stock in the numerical criteria, as Figure 5.1c demonstrates. Though the
yearly death counts predicted by model A5.2 are eerily similar to the actual recorded
deaths data, one can safely assert that the 1990 to 1994 period did not witness the LTTE
absolutely crushing the government while amassing an army of 1.8 million fighters in
the process. Furthermore, the data itself should not be trusted too much, as both sides
undoubtedly underreport their dead. Indeed, if both the yearly death counts and the
civilian death measure are to be believed, then only 4005 fighters died in the entire
period, as compared to 20000 civilians (see Appendix C.5).
5.2 Shortcomings
Though surprisingly accurate considering their simplicity, all of these models have seri-
ous shortcomings that must be addressed.
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Model State Error GDP Error Total Value Error Yearly Deaths Error
A2 0.094 0.0072 0.1013 5.7255
A3 0.0888 0.0058 0.0946 5.687
A4.1 0.0899 0.0061 0.096 11.1217
A4.2 0.0886 0.006 0.0945 6.378
A4.3 0.0887 0.006 0.0947 7.3519
A5.1 7.7106 0.015 7.7256 97.4989
A5.2 7.7629 0.0049 7.7678 1.6103
A5.3 7.7125 0.0161 7.7286 105.6546
B2 0.0918 0.0072 0.0991 5.9785
B3 0.0861 0.0058 0.0919 5.9494
B4.1 0.088 0.0061 0.0941 11.7253
B4.2 0.0858 0.0059 0.0917 6.5946
B4.3 0.086 0.0059 0.092 7.6403
B5.1 - - - -
B5.2 8.1057 0.0031 8.1088 20.7177
B5.3 - - - -
Table 5.1: Scores Based on Critera
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Model Cumulative Deaths Error Civilian Cost Evaluation Outcome
A2 0.3486 0.451 4
A3 0.3458 0.4521 4
A4.1 2.0287 0.1921 4
A4.2 0.3721 0.4647 4
A4.3 0.4564 0.4264 4
A5.1 45.4556 -0.5886 2
A5.2 0.3823 0.7729 2
A5.3 49.2775 -0.6365 2
B2 0.427 0.415 4
B3 0.4242 0.4157 4
B4.1 2.3817 0.1634 4
B4.2 0.4185 0.4276 4
B4.3 0.5467 0.3898 4
B5.1 - - -
B5.2 3.7299 0.3753 2
B5.3 - - -
Table 5.2: Scores Based on Critera (cont.)
42
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
5
10
15
x 104 Model B4.2 − Troop Levels: Sri Lanka
Time (years)
Fi
gh
te
rs
State
Rebels
State Observed
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
5
10
15
x 104 Model A2 − Troop Levels: Sri Lanka
Time (years)
Fi
gh
te
rs
State
Rebels
State Observed
a
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 104 Model A3 − Cumulative War−Related Deaths
Time (years)
D
ea
th
s
State
Rebel
Civilian
Total
Total Observed
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 104 Model A4.1 − Cumulative War−Related Deaths
Time (years)
D
ea
th
s
State
Rebel
Civilian
Total
Total Observed
b
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Model A5.2 − Yearly War−Related Deaths
Time (years)
D
ea
th
s
State
Rebel
Civilian
Total
Total Observed
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
x 105 Model A5.2 − Troop Levels: Sri Lanka
Time (years)
Fi
gh
te
rs
State
Rebels
State Observed
c
Figure 5.1: a) Best Performer vs. Worst Performer (Troop Count); b) Best Performer
vs. Worst Performer (Cumulative Deaths); c) Actual “Best” Yearly Deaths Performer
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5.2.1 Level 5 Models
Though it certainly made finding a winner among the models easier, the dismal failure
of all the level 5 models is nevertheless distressing. However, their spectacular inability
to make even the most basic predictions about the course of the war is a good example
of the main benefit of testing hypotheses with mathematical models: namely, how said
hypotheses cannot hide even their tiniest flaws from scrutiny.
In this case, the implicit hypothesis these balance of power models made was that
the amount of revenue either side could extract from the GDP was directly proportional
to how much power they had. This assumption missed the rather critical fact that the
army is not the IRS - in other words, to have control over a territory does not equate
to having the proper bureaucratic machinery necessary to govern it (or at least tax it).
Indeed, were the entire Sri Lankan government and army to vanish overnight, taking its
census statistics and tax payer registration database with it, the Tigers would probably
need years to restore the administrative structure to a state where they could finally
afford the champagne to celebrate their unexpected victory. Indeed, reports from the
eastern province where the Tigers until recently effectively were the government, their
method of raising finances involved more along the lines of kidnapping and extortion
than standardized income taxation (Nessman, 2007). This seems to support the finding
in (DeRouen Jr. and Sobek, 2004) about the importance of the state’s bureaucracy in
determining the outcome of a civil war.
However, while one can get away with leaving out all consideration of the balance of
power and ability to raise revenue in the case of Sri Lanka, where the government was
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at no point seriously threatened, it would be an issue in other examples. If one were
applying the models to the first Liberian civil war, for example, the government’s waning
power and Charles Taylor’s eventual consolidation of control could not be accurately
represented in any of the lower level models. At the very least, the balance term in dS
dt
should be left in to reflect the inability of the government’s tax-collection apparatus to
operate in rebel-controlled territory, while the balance term in dR
dt
could be removed and
the income term be changed to iR1G as it is in the lower level models. However, the
ideal scenario is one where both balance terms remain, and additional terms (or even
just constant parameters) are added to account for bureaucratic effectiveness.
5.2.2 Other Models
Too Many Rebels - The main flaw of all the more successful models is their overes-
timation of the number of rebels. Whereas most estimates record the rebel army as
between five thousand and fifteen thousand (Sydney Morning Herald, 1990; McCarthy,
1990; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), most of the models show the
rebels’ numbers to be around twenty-five thousand by the end of the period, with the
lowest estimates (models A4.1 and B4.1) being about twenty thousand.
This leads to problems beyond just an overestimation in rebel strength. As all of
the models assume the number of people killed is proportional to the sizes of the state’s
army and the rebels’ forces, too many rebels equates with too many deaths, and thus
the nearly universal overestimation among models of the final death toll.
One can imagine several possible explanations for this overestimation. The most
45
obvious is actually the easiest to correct (in theory, anyways): bad parameter values. If
fR or iR is too big, or cR is too small, then clearly rebel troop counts will be too high.
Likewise, if kR is too large (not difficult to imagine, considering the necessarily hap-
hazardous manner of its estimation), the hypothetical rebels will have more income to
use for their hypothetical war effort than their living, breathing, and state-overthrowing
counterparts. Unfortunately, the values of some of these numbers are known only to the
rebels themselves, and thus may prove impervious to solid estimation.
Moving away from the conveniently easy explanation of deficient parameters, one
can also examine possible structural defects in the models. One is the approximated
opportunity cost assumption inherent in the term qi
G
p
- namely, that the cost of upkeep
for a single rebel is the median income. Though this assumption deftly dodges the
difficulty in calculating the actual rebel upkeep cost (again, something only the rebels
themselves can know for sure), it could be utterly wrong. If so, then one would have to
revert back to the level 1 rebel expense term xRR in all of the models, or at least find
a more accurate proportion of GDP/capita to approximate rebel expenses.
The most difficult and unpleasant possibility is that the simplifying assumption that
rebel training and outfitting can be accurately modeled by instantaneous inflows is
wrong. If this is the case, one would have two options: either to create an additional
population to represent rebels-in-training (thus losing some of the models’ simplicity),
and have incoming rebels flow through this middle man term; or to use delay differential
equations rather than ordinary differential equations (thus losing some of the analytic
tools one has in studying ODEs). However, if one really cannot represent the training
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of fighters as an instantaneous inflow, it seems logical that similar problems would arise
in the state troop count. But as Table 5.1 makes clear, the size of the state’s forces is
represented with shocking accuracy in all of the non-level 5 models.
Perpetual Recruitment - Another problem, more abstract because it creates prob-
lems mainly over the long term, and yet potentially more dangerous because it leads
to inaccuracies in qualitative behavior, is how both sides’ numbers increase indefinitely.
Though the rate at which both sides forces grow is very slight after their initial re-
cruitment drives, it is nevertheless an upward trend. This is a problem because 1) as
noted before, the amount of carnage predicted by the model increases with the number
of combatants, so ever increasing combatant pools cause ever increasing death counts;
2) model analysis will be skewed because it assumes both sides are getting larger and
larger over time.
Why do the models predict such swelling armies? Mainly because both sides receive
some portion of their income from the GDP, which in the case of Sri Lanka has steadily
grown despite the war. Thus, it makes sense that the state’s numbers are increasing
faster than the rebels’, since the rebels rely primarily on foreign funding, which is as-
sumed to stay constant in this model (though it might be worth changing this to reflect
the growth of the GDPs of the countries from which their funds originate).
Why does an expanding GDP throw off the results like this? After all, the actual
Sri Lankan military receives its income from taxes drawn from the GDP as well. And
lest one think the reason is that the model does not take inflation into account, note
that r, the economic growth rate parameter, was calculated from real GDP growth rate
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data rather than nominal data. In fact, the reason is probably that the model does
not acknowledge that military technology, and thus military expenditure, expands over
time much like the global economy. Thus, the ever increasing defense budget is invested
in more advanced hardware rather than more soldiers, a trend that may well hold for
the rebels as well as they throw down their homemade bazookas and pick up Stinger
missiles instead.
Solving this problem would probably require a close study of changes in military
technology and budget, something well beyond the scope of this study. However, it
seems likely the the key to the problem lies in replacing the constants cS and cR with
functions cS(t) and cR(t), thus making the system of ODEs non-autonomous. Perhaps
something as simple as cS(t) = αt+ c0, with α and c0 determined by fitting a trend line
to past data on (inflation-adjusted) military hardware costs, would suffice.
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Chapter 6
Model Analysis: Examining
Apocalypse
Having painstakingly identifying the best model out of these sixteen, we can now extract
some insight from it through some analysis. Before continuing, however, it would be
useful to define some simple axioms to keep such insight relevant to the real world.
First, it seems reasonable to assume one is examining an actual inhabited country -
in other words, as far as our purposes go, economic activity of some kind bounded by
borders.
Axiom 1 (State Existence). G > 0 for all t.
It also seems reasonable to assume that neither side’s army will have a negative
number of fighters, and also neither army can get too big as compared to the country’s
population. In the case of Sri Lanka, if we let α denote the percent of the island’s
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population made up of Tamil’s, which was roughly 18% in 1990 (Gamini and Chaudhary,
1990), and assume that neither side’s army is larger than 4% of its potential recruiting
base, then we arrive at the following axiom:
Axiom 2 (Bounded Armies). 0 ≤ S ≤ Smax = .04p and 0 ≤ R ≤ Rmax = .04αp for all
t.
Note that this means 0 ≤ S ≤ 6.8454 × 105 and 0 ≤ R ≤ 1.2322 × 105, which is
hardly too restrictive a bound (if both the army and the LTTE take their maximum
values, then 4.72% of the population would be at war, a staggering number).
Finally, as all the parameters for all the models have implicit purposes and the use
of addition and subtraction in their formulation follows those purposes(for example, fS
is meant as an inflow of foreign funds, dRS1 is meant as a component in a kill rate),
it seems reasonable to assume the parameters are non-negative to preserve the signs
inherent to their purpose.
Axiom 3 (Parameter Non-Negativity). All parameters are non-negative real numbers.
6.1 Default dC, cC, dRS, dSR
To start out, we make the simplifying assumption that the values of dC , cC , dRS and dSR
are those used to run the model in Chapter 5 (see Appendix B). With this assumption
in place, several results arise through simple analysis.
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6.1.1 Things Never Get Dull: The Absence of Invariance
Generally, when one has a nonlinear dynamical system in need of analysis, one faces the
overwhelming temptation to attempt equilibrium analysis, or at least nullcline analysis.
However, the following proposition demonstrates that under the current axioms and
assumptions, one should suppress such temptation.
Proposition 1 (Nonexistence of Equilibria). Under the assumptions and axioms given,
the model has no equilibria.
Before beginning the proof, it is worthwhile to make the following substitutions to
simplify the algebra involved:
m1 = kSfsc
−1
S
m2 = kSiSc
−1
S
m3 = kSxSc
−1
S
m4 = dSR1
m5 = kRfRc
−1
R
m6 = kRiR1c
−1
R
m7 = kRqi(cRp)
−1
m8 = dRS1
m9 = r
m10 = cCdC
This results in the following simplified system of equations:
dS
dt
= m1 +m2G−m3S −m4SR (6.1)
dR
dt
= m5 +m6G−m7GR−m8SR (6.2)
dG
dt
= m9G−m10GRS(m4 +m8) (6.3)
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Proof. To find equilibria, one can set the system equal to [000]T . However, note that if
dG
dt
= 0, then either G = 0 or m9 −m10RS(m4 +m8) = 0. By Axiom 1, G 6= 0. Then it
must be thatm9−m10RS(m4+m8) = 0. But then RS = m9m10(m4+m8) = rcCdC(dSR1+dRS1) =
9.7338 × 1010 by the assumptions of this section. Even if R = Rmax = 1.2322 × 105,
then S must equal 7.8995× 105 > Smax = 6.8454× 105 in violation of Axiom 2. Thus,
dG
dt
> 0 and so the system is never at equilibrium.
This last statement immediately gives rise to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. G is a strictly increasing function of t.
However, one may very well wonder if in spite of the GDP’s refusal to settle, the
size of the state and rebel armies might not eventually come to a still point, perhaps
along the stable manifold of some distant saddle point beyond the bounds of variable
space cordoned off by the axioms taken. However, the following series of propositions
demonstrates that given some reasonable assumptions about the parameters, such is
impossible.
Proposition 2 (Non-Invariance of S). If m2 6= 0, then S does not remain constant.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that some S∗ exists such that for appropriate values of
G,R, and the parameters, S(t) = S∗ for a nondegenerate interval of t. Then
dS
dt
= m1 +m2G−m3S∗ −m4S∗R = 0
If either R is constant or m4 = 0, then
dS
dt
is a function of solely G, which is strictly
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increasing by Corollary 1. Thus, it must be that m4 6= 0 and R varies. As dSdt = 0 for a
non-degenerate interval of t and thus is constant, it must be that
d2S
dt2
= m2G
′ −m4S∗R′ = 0
Then G′ ∝ R′. But G′ = dG
dt
is clearly not proportional to R′ = dR
dt
for varying G,R.
This contradicts the assumptions about S∗, so S∗ must not exist.
Proposition 3 (Non-Invariance of R). If m2 6= 0, and one of the following holds:
1. m5 6= 0
2. m6 6= 0
3. R 6= 0
then R does not remain constant.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that some R∗ exists such that for appropriate values of
G,S, and the parameters, R(t) = R∗ for a nondegenerate interval of t. Then
dR
dt
= m5 +m6G−m7GR∗ −m∗SR∗ = 0
First, note that if condition 1 or 2 is true but 3 is not, then 0 = m5 +m6G > 0, a
contradiction. Thus, either condition 1 or 2 implies condition 3.
As m2 6= 0, S is not constant by Proposition 2. Further, as dRdt = 0 for a non-
degenerate interval of t and thus is constant, it must be that
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d2R
dt2
= (m6 −m7R∗)G′ −m8R∗S ′ = 0
If m6 − m7R∗ = 0, then d2Rdt2 is a function of S ′ 6= 0 (recall that m8 6= 0 by the
assumptions of the section). Thus, m6−m7R∗ 6= 0 and so it must be that G′ ∝ S ′. But
G′ = dG
dt
is clearly not proportional to S ′ = dS
dt
for varying G,S. This contradicts the
assumptions about R∗, so R∗ must not exist.
For m2 to be zero, it must be that either iS = 0 or kS = 0. However, as one cannot
imagine any situation where the state cuts all military spending (during a civil war, no
less), and as it seems unlikely that not a single penny of military spending makes it past
rent-seekers, it is probably safe to assume that m2 > 0 in any realistic situation.
Furthermore, the possibility that the rebels funds, both foreign and otherwise, will
be cut off completely seems equally unlikely. However, even given that possibility, it so
happens that the hypothesis on R∗ is stronger than it need be - given any combination
of parameter values and R0 (the initial number of rebels) 6= 0, R will never equal zero
and thus will remain invariant.
However, this is not to say that for the right parameter values and values of S and G
that R will not become very close to zero - which is the motivation of the next section.
6.1.2 Money Matters: Rebel Finances
As Propositions 1 - 3 prove, equilibrium analysis and blind nullcline analysis will not
yield much insight. However, using the parameters already defined and more careful
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examination of the zeros of the individual equations, one can still extract some useful
counterfactual insights about this phase of the Sri Lankan civil war.
One may well wonder if the conflict would have ended sooner given different condi-
tions when the Indian Peace-Keeping Force left. More precisely, one can ask how the
situation would have had to have differed for the government to have quickly defeated
the rebels and ended the insurgency. If one considers a quick end to the situation to
entail the rebels’ losing from the very start of the period, then one need only find the
points when dR
dt
is negative keeping all other factors constant. Perhaps the most prof-
itable enterprise would be to find how many state security personnel would be necessary
to crush the insurgency from its very inception given different parameters relating to the
rebels’ finances. More specifically, we can examine cR (cost of producing new troops)
and fR (amount of foreign funding). Furthermore, as the method of calculating rebel
expenses is questionable (especially given the model’s massive overestimation of rebel
numbers), one can also treat qi as an expense parameter. I leave iR1 (proportion of GDP
diverted to rebel cause through extortion, etc.) out of this discussion because the rebels
are probably extorting income from areas they control and thus which the government
cannot affect.
If one considers the time points when dR
dt
< 0 to be those at which the rebels are
losing, then one can check the zero of dR
dt
for different values of fR, cR, and qi at the
beginning of the period studied to find the critical S∗ value at which the rebels are
neither winning nor losing. Thus, for any S > S∗, the rebels will be losing. One can
thus form the following function:
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S∗ = φ(fR, cR, qi) =
kR(fR + iR1G+ qi
G
p
R)
dRS1cRR
Using the standard values of fR, iR1, and qi, one finds that the Sri Lankan government
would have needed no fewer than about 1.1716 million soldiers to have been defeating the
Tigers from the very moment the IPKF left. Even if one assumes the rebel-associated
costs and expenses are erroneously too cheap and takes half the funding and twice both
the outfitting cost and the expense proportion of GDP/Capita, one has that the state
would have needed at least about three hundred thousand soldiers, a slap in the face of
those who say just a little more military might is all the state needs to put down the
insurgency.
If one examines only fR and leaves the other two parameters constant, then one can
set φ = S0, where S0 is the number of troops the Sri Lankan government had at the
start of the observed period, Solving for fR, one finds that the government could have
been defeating the rebels from the start if only the rebels’ foreign funding amounted to
−5.3784×105 - in other words, if only foreigners were somehow stealing over five hundred
thousand dollars a year from LTTE coffers, a not-quite realistic hope. What this means
is that the rebels are bringing in enough money from extortion, etc. (iR1G) that they
could have fought on against an army of S0 = 22000 government soldiers without a
penny of foreign funds. Depressingly, this result is qualitatively resilient - indeed, once
again doubling the rebel’s costs only reduces the required pilfering to about 1.2 hundred
thousand dollars.
However, if one assumes the government somehow cuts off all foreign funds (fR = 0),
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then one finds that the government would have needed only about 86,000 troops to
have been defeating the rebels - a number well under how many soldiers the government
had even by the beginning of 1991. Doubling the assumed rebel costs here brings that
number down to only about 30,000 soldiers. Thus, the importance of finances to the
rebel cause, especially foreign funding, become starkly obvious. Though of course anyone
could guess that less funding would have an adverse impact on an army’s functionality,
the model now makes quantitatively clear just how important - indeed, the difference
between needing 86,000 versus 1.7 million soldiers to put down an insurgency is difficult
to ignore.
One can thus vary any of the three parameters while holding the other two constant
to calculate values for φ. Graphs of the results can be found in Figure 6.1. Furthermore,
one can vary all three parameters simultaneously and graph the level plane φ = S0, as
was done in Figure 6.2. Note that due to the limitations of the technology, neither of the
graphs here is perfectly accurate but instead depicts φ = S0 ± Serr for different values
Serr within acceptable bounds.
Observing the cornrows of Figure 6.2a and the more narrow trails of Figure 6.2b, one
is mainly impressed by the overwhelming power of cR - the cost of outfitting a new rebel
fighter - in determining the number of soldiers needed. Indeed, whereas wide variation
in the other two parameters leads to relatively little change, variations in cR are mainly
responsible for the sheathes of parameter space where φ drops well below the amount of
troops the government had to start out the period examined. A quick glance at Figure
6.1b confirms this - whereas the other two parameters show linear relationships with S∗,
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cR relates rationally. Furthermore, it may not be entirely feasible for the government
to increase qi, as such would involve increasing food prices and other expenses of life,
at least in the areas where rebels buy such goods. Thus, the marginal gain to the
government is maximized by increasing cR, at least up until about $1500/rebel. One
might consider this a mathematical argument to add to the long list of humanitarian
arguments in favor of cracking down on the international arms trade.
6.2 Altered dC
One need not hold to the assumptions of Section 6.1. However, it seems unlikely that
either side could ever easily change cC (neither side has much power over how much
economic damage a civilian death has) or either dSR1 or dRS1 (if either side could do
something to kill more efficiently, then it would probably have already been done). But
something over which both sides have some control is dC , the proportion of civilians
killed to fighters killed. Unfortunately, it might cross the strategic minds of either side
to kill more civilians in the hopes of crippling the enemy’s source of funding, and thus
it might be worthwhile to vary this parameter.
Strangely, even after increasing dC to a very large number (such that
dG
dt
can be
made zero with troop counts well within those allowed by Axiom 2), preliminary anal-
ysis reveals no reasonable equilibria. However, this could conceivably be due to flaws
in the numerical methods used to find such equilibria (modified Newton’s method).
Nevertheless, it seems that equilibrium analysis again fails to be of use.
However, much like one can analyze the conditions under which the rebel forces
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Figure 6.1: Troops Needed for Rebels to be Losing from the Start, Varying a) Foreign
Funding (fR); b) Rebel Creation Cost (cR); c) Proportion of GDP/Capita Needed to
Upkeep One Rebel (qi)
59
05
10
x 106
2000
4000
6000
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
fR
Level Surface: 21500 ≤ S* = φ(fR, cR, qi) ≤ 22500 
cR
q i
0
5
10
x 106
10002000
30004000
5000
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
fR
Level Surface: 21500 ≤ S* = φ(fR, cR, qi) ≤ 22500 
cR
q i
a
0
5
10
x 106
2000
4000
6000
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
fR
21900 ≤ S* = φ(fR, cR, qi) ≤ 22100
cR
q i
0
5
10
x 106
10002000
30004000
5000
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
fR
21900 ≤ S* = φ(fR, cR, qi) ≤ 22100
cR
q i
b
Figure 6.2: Loci of Points Satisfying Conditions: a) Lower Precision; b) Higher Precision
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fR (×106) cR qi fR (×106) cR qi
0.4545 3800 0.223 4.7727 4550 1.952
0.5682 4750 0.1787 5.3409 4250 2.218
1.0227 1200 0.7107 5.9091 3950 2.484
1.1364 4450 0.4447 6.0227 4900 2.4397
1.5909 900 0.9767 6.4773 3650 2.75
1.7045 4150 0.7107 6.5909 4600 2.7057
2.1591 600 1.2427 7.0455 3350 3.016
2.2727 3850 0.9767 7.1591 4300 2.9717
2.3864 4800 0.9323 7.7273 4000 3.2377
2.8409 3550 1.2427 7.8409 4950 3.1933
2.9545 4500 1.1983 8.2955 3700 3.5037
3.5227 4200 1.4643 8.4091 4650 3.4593
3.9773 650 1.9963 8.8636 3400 3.7697
4.0909 3900 1.7303 8.9773 4350 3.7253
4.2045 4850 1.686 9.5455 4050 3.9913
4.6591 3600 1.9963 9.6591 5000 3.947
Table 6.1: Loci of Points: 21990 ≤ S∗ = φ(fR, cR, qi) ≤ 22010
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decline, one can likewise analyze the conditions under which the national GDP declines.
Setting dG
dt
= 0, one finds that the number of civilian deaths in a year (dC [dSR1 +
dRS1]SR) needed to completely counter all real economic growth is r/cC , or about 91,426
for the parameter values calculated. Needless to say, this number cannot be taken as
divine revelation or absolute truth - after all, it is based solely on averages derived from
small numbers of deaths. Thus, one can easily imagine that as the number of deaths
in a given year approaches something large (certainly less than 91,426, or .5% of the
population), mass emmigration and the economic implosions that come with it would
follow. However, one can take this number as a best case scenario and mentally adjust
accordingly.
Figure 6.3a and Table 6.2 give some indication of just how little carnage is needed
even in this best case scenario to create an economic halt. Even for the relatively modest
values of 120,000 soldiers and 15,000 rebels, one need only about 25 civilians to die for
each fighter killed for the economy to halt. Though this civilian/fighter proportion is
far higher than that calculated for the model tests in Chapter 5, it is probably not
too impressive (to use the word very loosely) compared to something like the Second
Congolese War, especially if one factors in the indirect deaths resulting from disease and
famine that inevitably accompany brutal civil wars. According to Figure 6.2b and Table
6.3, this means somewhere between 3,000 and 4,500 fighter deaths, a higher-than-usual
but hardly inconceivable number.
The consequences of such an economic halt (or, if the targeting of civilians is higher
than prescribed here, an economic recession) would be dire. For the state, it would
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R5000 15000 25000 35000 45000
20000 454.4 151.5 90.9 64.9 50.5
S 120000 75.7 25.2 15.1 10.8 8.4
220000 41.3 13.8 8.3 5.9 4.6
320000 28.4 9.5 5.7 4.1 3.2
420000 21.6 7.2 4.3 3.1 2.4
Table 6.2: Values of dC for different S,R such that economic growth is halted (rounded)
mean first that its own main source of revenue (taxes) would be harmed even as the
rebels’ main source (foreign funds, at least in the period examined) remains reliable.
Worse, the median income (qi
G
p
) would stagnate or even decline, making it easier for
the rebels to entice the poor and/or jobless into their ranks. The rebels, meanwhile,
would have to deal with issues not addressed in this model but poignant nevertheless:
namely, the possibility of a decline in their funds from diasporic Tamils if they become
too closely associated with the killing of civilians, and the prospect of gaining a starving
and impoverished Eelam even in the event of victory.
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Figure 6.3: a) Number of civilians to be killed for every fighter killed for given number
of soldiers and rebels to halt economic growth; b) Number of fighters to be killed for a
given value of dC to halt economic growth
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dC Fighter Deaths
0.1 914259
10.1 9052
20.1 4549
30.1 3037
40.1 2280
50.1 1825
60.1 1521
70.1 1304
80.1 1141
90.1 1015
Table 6.3: Fighter deaths needed to halt economic growth (rounded)
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Part III
Conclusions
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary of Results
7.1.1 Model Testing
After comparing all the models in Appendix A to actual data from the 1990 to 1994
period of the Sri Lankan civil war, I conclude that model A3 barely takes the title of
most accurate. The Level 5 models surprisingly turned out to be spectacular failures
and thus require reworking. All of the other models show reasonably good qualitative
and quantitative results in most respects.
However, they all have the shortcomings of predicting an overabundance of rebel
forces and also predicting ongoing (if slight) troop buildups even when the actual data
shows a distinct leveling-off. Furthermore, as one would expect from a model based
on differential equations, the models are only as good as the parameters they are fed.
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Further cases must be tested to find which models are more or less susceptible to the
damage caused by poor parameter values.
Nevertheless, if one can calculate decent parameter values, the models may prove
very useful in making short-term inferences of civil war course and military capabilities.
Such may prove invaluable to future research in either testing hypotheses about the
relationship between military capabilities and other variables (such as decisions to sue
for peace) or even making predictions about wars in progress.
7.1.2 Model Analysis
By implementing some basic axioms about S,R,G, and the parameters, and further
assuming that dC , cC , dRS, and dSR are the values as calculated in Appendix B (a rea-
sonable assumption, considering how difficult changing all but dC would be for either
side), one can prove that the model A3 has no equilibria and in fact lacks invariance
of any kind. This means that equilibrium analysis within this restricted parameter and
variable space is futile.
However, I demonstrated that one can nonetheless find crucial counterfactual in-
formation about how the war might have gone given different circumstances. More
specifically, it seems that mere troop numbers are not enough to suppress the LTTE
insurgency unless the government stops rebel finances.
If one allows dC to vary, equilibria within the axiomatically defined range for S,R,
and G are still scarce. However, analysis of the dG
dt
equation reveals that a sharp increase
in the number of civilians killed could bring economic growth to a standstill.
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7.2 Policy Recommendations
• Casually though terms such as “war on terror” may be thrown about, a mere
massive application of troops would not have been enough to suppress the LTTE
insurgency in 1990 and probably would not be enough now, either. The less glori-
ous but more effective parts of counter-terrorism - namely, freezing terrorist assets
and working with foreign governments to halt the flow of “charitable” donations -
could be what really win the war.
• As raising the cost of outfitting new rebel fighters seems the most plausible and
most effective means of cutting down rebel growth potential, governments should
do more to stop the flow of black market weaponry throughout the world. By
making weapons more scarce, governments can make weapons more expensive,
and as a result make civil war more expensive.
• Both sides (but especially the government, considering its reliance on tax revenue)
must take great pains to reign in the scale of civilian deaths. If civilian deaths get
out of hand (as is inevitable if either or both sides begin targeting civilians out of
demagoguery or even unprofessional conduct by individual soldiers), the result is
inevitably a noticeable decline in economic performance. The analysis here shows
that even in a best case scenario, such a decline would happen even with battles
of moderate intensity if civilian deaths become a rule and not an exception.
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7.3 Future Research
This paper has demonstrated that relatively simple mathematical models - mere three-
dimensional systems of ordinary differential equations - can nonetheless make surpris-
ingly accurate predictions about military capabilities and civil war casualties when given
accurate parameter values. However, the limitations of the models suggest that adding
a little complexity could be beneficial.
At the very least, my recommendations in Section 5.2 - namely, fixing the Level 5
models, improving parameter values, and modeling the ever-increasing prices of weaponry
- must be implemented. Furthermore, it would behoove future researchers to test the
improved models’ accuracies in predicting wars other than Sri Lanka’s to verify their
universality and find their limits given the assumptions upon which they were built (see
Section 4.1). The greatest reward of such work would be a vast body of parameter
values across different cases from which analysts can infer the nature of the values pa-
rameters take in general. With this understanding, it may be possible to approximate
parameters in cases where accurate data is hard to find - such as with wars that have
not yet happened or have only just begun.
But why stop with only mild improvements to the models presented here? After
all, ordinary differential equations are but one of the advanced mathematical modeling
methods available to the intrepid international relations analyst, and indeed are perhaps
the simplest. Though less well-understood than their ordinary counterparts, partial dif-
ferential equations offer a powerful means of breaking the problem into its component
causes and adding independent variables other than just time. Delay differential equa-
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tions, meanwhile, can reduce the instantaneousness that renders other calculus-based
models questionable in their accuracy in politics. Finally, one need not restrict oneself to
merely deterministic models, as stochastic modeling methods such as Poisson processes,
continuous-time Markov chains, and stochastic differential equations should be explored
as well.
Indeed, all possible methods of understanding how wars can be stopped and casual-
ties minimized must be explored. After all, the makers of war use all possible methods
to ply their trade - can those who wish to make peace afford to do any less?
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Appendix A
Models Tested
Here are the complete equations of all the models tested in this study. Note that param-
eters of similar function but different derivation and/or dimensions have similar names
and are differentiated by numbers.
A2
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS1RS
dG
dt
= rG
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B2
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR2R
S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS1RS
dG
dt
= rG
A3
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS1RS
dG
dt
= rG− cCG [dC (dSR1SR + dRS1RS)]
B3
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR2R
S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS1RS
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS1RS
)]
A4.1
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS R
eS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR1SR + dRS2RS
ReS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
)]
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A4.2
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS × hR2S
p
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR1SR + dRS2RS × hR2S
p
)]
A4.3
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS
[
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
]
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR1SR + dRS2RS
{
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
})]
B4.1
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR2R
S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS R
eS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS2RS
ReS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
)]
B4.2
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR2R
S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS × hR2S
p
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS2RS × hR2S
p
)]
75
B4.3
dS
dt
= c−1S1kS(fS + iSG− xSS)− dSR2R
S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR1G− qi
G
p
R)− dRS2RS
[
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
]
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS2RS
{
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
})]
A5.1
dS
dt
= c−1S2kS(fS + iS
S
S +R
G− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR2
R
S +R
G− qiG
p
R)− dRS2RS R
eS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR1SR + dRS2RS
ReS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
)]
A5.2
dS
dt
= c−1S2kS(fS + iS
S
S +R
G− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR2
R
S +R
G− qiG
p
R)− dRS2RS × hR2S
p
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR1SR + dRS2RS × hR2S
p
)]
A5.3
dS
dt
= c−1S2kS(fS + iS
S
S +R
G− xSS)− dSR1SR
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR2
R
S +R
G− qiG
p
R)− dRS2RS
[
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
]
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR1SR + dRS2RS
{
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
})]
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B5.1
dS
dt
= c−1S2kS(fS + iS
S
S +R
G− xSS)− dSR2R S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR2
R
S +R
G− qiG
p
R)− dRS2RS R
eS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS2RS
ReS
ReS + ( S
hR1/p
)eS
)]
B5.2
dS
dt
= c−1S2kS(fS + iS
S
S +R
G− xSS)− dSR2R S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR2
R
S +R
G− qiG
p
R)− dRS2RS × hR2S
p
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS2RS × hR2S
p
)]
B5.3
dS
dt
= c−1S2kS(fS + iS
S
S +R
G− xSS)− dSR2R S
S + 1
dR
dt
= c−1R kR(fR + iR2
R
S +R
G− qiG
p
R)− dRS2RS
[
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
]
dG
dt
= rG− cCG
[
dC
(
dSR2R
S
S + 1
+ dRS2RS
{
ReS
ReS + (S
2
)eS
+ hR3
S
p
})]
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Appendix B
Parameters
Paramter Value Parameter (cont.) Value
cC 5.87908E-07 hR1 2.1493e+008
cR 800 hR2 38.9550
cS1 9946.399441 hR3 38.6043
cS2 1759.1 iR1 0.000116812
dC 0.466787853 iR2 0.048507224
dRS1 1.47155E-06 iS 0.0340625
dRS2 4.78154E-06 kR 0.7
dSR1 5.40636E-07 kS 1
dSR2 0.082038835 p 17113532
eS 2.947448552 qi 0.098261546
fR 9128789.842 r 0.05375
fS 0 xS 2456.77539
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B.1 cC
[Dimensions] = GDP lost/Total GDP
year
/Civilians Killed = 1
people·time
Constant price GDP growth rates for Sri Lanka for the years 1986 to 2005 were
drawn from the GDP annual growth rate, 1990 prices, US$ (UN estimates) series of
the U.N. Common Database (United Nations Statistics Division, 2008). Using the
intensity indicators from the Uppsalla Conflict Data Project (Department of Peace and
Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008), each year was classified as either a war
year or a peace year (either “No” or “Minor” in UCDP parlance was coded as peace).
The difference of the average of the peace years and the average of the war years was
then divided by the total number of civilians killed in this time span, as calculated by
taking the product of the total number of people killed (Farrell, 2001) and the average
proportion of civilian deaths to total deaths as calculated using similar data and methods
as dC was calculated.
B.2 cR
[Dimensions] = cost
new rebel fighter
= dollars
people
According to (Bazzi, 2001), AK-47s can be imported from China for $400. It is
assumed for lack of better information that inflation is countered by decreases in gun
production prices (especially on such a low-tech model) and thus the price in 1990 was
the same. Lacking any better information on the cost of training a new soldier, it was
also assumed that it costs as much to learn the use of a weapon as it does to buy the
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weapon. Thus, the total cost of outfitting a new rebel is 2 · $400 = $800.
B.3 cS1
[Dimensions] = cost
new soldier
= dollars
people
Taking any model of level less than five, and one can solve a slightly more generalized
form of the dS
dt
equation for: cS1 =
fS+iSG−xSS
[change in troop levels]−[troops killed] . Take fS, iS, and xS as
calculated below. Calculate the change in troop levels by subtracting the 1990 value from
the 1991 value of troop levels from the Armed forces, weapons holdings and employment
in arms production table of the Facts on International Relations and Security Trends
database (International Relations and Security Network and Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2008). The number of troops killed in 1990 was approximated
from information in (Morris, 1991). The midpoint method was used to find values for S
and G: thus, S was set as the change in troop levels divided by two, and using the value
for r as calculated below, one can approximate the midpoint value of G as G0 · exp(.5r).
Note that the military expenditure is approximated with iSG rather than the actual
1990 value because the goal is to find an average expenditure number across all years
rather than simply 1990, and the percentage military expenditure number iS captures
this cross-year average better than the actual expenditure in 1990 (which is somewhat
smaller than any of the years after it).
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B.4 cS2
[Dimensions] = cost
new soldier
= dollars
people
This was calculated exactly as cS1 was, except iSG is now multiplied by
S
S+R
. The
value for R was taken to be simply 5000, which was first found in the Syndey Morning
Herald (Sydney Morning Herald, 1990) and corroborated by The Independent (Mc-
Carthy, 1990). As both of these articles came out fairly late in the year, this number
was taken as the general midpoint value despite that it was also used as the initial value
(so we assume rebel numbers did not change dramatically in 1990).
B.5 dC
[Dimensions] = civilians killed
fighter killed
= 1
Data for the number of civilians killed and the total number of people killed were
drawn from the Armed Conflict Database (International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2008) for 2005, 2006, and the periods January to March, April to June, and July to
September from the year 2007. The number of combatants killed was duly calculated,
and for each period the ratio of civilians killed to fighters killed was calculated. These
ratios were averaged for the final value of dC .
B.6 dRS1
[Dimensions] = rebels killed/total rebels
soldiers
/year = 1
people·time
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Unfortunately, data for the number of soldiers and rebels killed in addition to the
total number of soldiers and rebels involved was only available for two time periods: six
months of 1990 and the entire year of 2006. This parameter was calculated using data
from the latter drawn from the Armed Conflict Database (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2008) using the following formula: dRS1 =
rebels killed/total rebels
total soldiers
/1 year,
where the total number of rebels was the number reporting in at year’s end plus the
number killed and likewise for the total number of soldiers.
B.7 dRS2
[Dimensions] = rebels killed/total rebels
soldiers
/year = 1
people·time
Calculated similarly to dRS1 using soldier counts data from the Armed forces, weapons
holdings and employment in arms production table of the Facts on International Rela-
tions and Security Trends database (International Relations and Security Network and
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008), rebel counts data from The
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney Morning Herald, 1990) that was corroborated by The
Independent (McCarthy, 1990), and soldier and rebel deaths data from The Guardian
(Morris, 1991). Note that the formula from dRS1 is slightly different here, as everything
is divided by 0.5 years rather than one year. This intense period at the resumption
of hostilities after the departure of the Indian Peacekeeping Force is taken as an up-
per bound for the amount of carnage possible, and thus serves as the coefficient of the
modified formulas of the level 4 and 5 dR
dt
equations.
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B.8 dSR1
[Dimensions] = soldiers killed/total rebels
soldiers
/year = 1
people·time
This was calculated exactly like dRS1 was, except with the number of soldiers killed
in the numerator rather than the number of rebels killed.
B.9 dSR2
[Dimensions] = soldiers killed
rebel
/year = 1
time
This was calculated using the same data as dSR1, and used the same formula except
that the total number of soldiers was excluded from the denominator.
B.10 eS
[Dimensions] = 1
As this term is a general indicator of how well outfitted an army is (1 = the United
States military, 3 or greater = a marching band carrying water guns), it was calculated
using the following formula: eS = 3− 2 · Sri Lankan military expenditure/total troop countU.S. military expenditure/U.S. troop count . Data
for both Sri Lankan and U.S. expenditures were drawn from the Armed forces, weapons
holdings and employment in arms production table of the Facts on International Rela-
tions and Security Trends database (International Relations and Security Network and
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008), and both countries’ military
expenditures were pulled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s
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military expenditure database (Stockholm Institute of Peace Research, 2008). Data
for the each of the years 1990 to 1994 were fed into the formula, and the results were
averaged for the final value of eS.
B.11 fR
[Dimensions] = outside funding collected
year
= dollars
time
The Tamil Tigers fund their war largely through financial support from the various
Tamil diasporic communities throughout the world. According to the World Policy
Journal, the Tigers collect on average 3 million 2003 U.S. dollars from 45000 Swedish
Tamils. Using consumer price index numbers from the Consumer Price Index, 2000 =
100 (IMF) table of the United Nations Common Database (United Nations Statistics
Division, 2008), one can find an average contribution of 1990 U.S. dollars per person.
Using GDP and population data from the Population, official mid-year estimates series
and the GDP at market prices, 1990 prices, US$ series of the UN Common Database
(United Nations Statistics Division, 2008), one can calculate the 1990 GDP/capita of
Sweden in 1990 U.S. dollars. Using this, one can calculate the average percent of GDP
per capita contributed per Swedish Tamil. Assuming this number to be invariant across
all countries, one can similarly calculate 1990 GDP per capita numbers for Canada
and India (the two largest diasporic destinations) and multiply by the percentage just
calculated to find the average contribution in 1990 U.S. dollars per Canadian and Indian
Tamil.
These three country-specific average contributions per Tamil can be multiplied by
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numbers for the sizes of Tamil diasporic communities in the early 1990s in Canada
(Morris and Cruez, 1995), Switzerland (Swiss Review of World Affairs, 1995), and India
(The Economist, 1993) to find the foreign funding coming to the LTTE from each of those
countries. Adding these totals to the (deflated) estimated total coming from Britain
(Morris and Cruez, 1995), one has a rough estimate of the total diasporic contribution
to the LTTE war chest.
B.12 fS
[Dimensions] = outside funding collected
year
= dollars
time
Although the Sri Lankan government was receiving outside funding from various
organizations and governments (Edirisinghe, 1994), most of this was earmarked for
specific projects (dams, etc.) and thus could not be directly invested in the army. Any
shifting of other budgetary money into the military would be reflected in the military
expenditure numbers used to calculate iS and thus would only be double-counted here.
Thus, fS was assumed to be 0.
B.13 hR1
[Dimensions] = people
This mysterious “hiding” parameter does not yield up its real world meaning easily.
Nevertheless, one can calculate its value by solving the kill term in the dR
dt
equation of
any of the XX.1 models for hR1 and substituting Armed Conflict Database (International
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Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008) numbers in for the various terms. Thus, one has
hR1 =
Sp
R
(dRS2SR
[killed]
−1)−1/eS where S is the number of troops at year’s end plus the number
of troops killed in 2006 from the ACD, R is similarly determined from ACD rebel data,
p is the population of Sri Lanka in 2006 as drawn from the official mid-year estimates
series of the U.N. Common Database (United Nations Statistics Division, 2008) and
[killed] is taken to be the number of rebels reported killed in 2006 by the ACD.
B.14 hR2
[Dimensions] = 1
Another “hiding” parameter, this was calculated much as hR1 was but with a different
formula, as results from solving the rebel kill term in any of the XX.2 models: hR2 =
p·[killed]
dRS2RS2
.
B.15 hR3
[Dimensions] = 1
The third “hiding” parameter was calculated much like the others, this time solving
the rebel kill term in any of the XX.3 models: hR3 =
p
S
( [killed]
dRS2RS
− ReS
ReS+(S/2)eS
).
B.16 iR1
[Dimensions] = dollars extorted
GDP
/year = 1
time
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Lacking any better information on the LTTE’s ability to extract money from the
national economy via extortion and drug trafficking, I relied largely on a BBC summary
of a Sri Lankan radio broadcast (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1995). According
to the report, eighty million Sri Lankan rupees were found to have been extorted from
businesses in Colombo in 1995. Dividing this by the GDP at current prices in local
currency for 1995 from the GDP at market prices, national currency, current prices (UN
estimates) series of the U.N. Common Database (United Nations Statistics Division,
2008), one has a very rough estimate of iR1.
B.17 iR2
[Dimensions] = dollars extorted
GDP
/year = 1
time
As this term represents the ideal amount the Tamil Tigers would extort if they
controlled the entire country, it was taken to be simply equal to what the Sri Lankan
army does take (i.e. iS).
B.18 iS
[Dimensions] = military expenditure
GDP
/year = 1
time
Numbers for Sri Lankan military expenditure as a percentage of GDP as drawn
from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s military expenditure database
(Stockholm Institute of Peace Research, 2008) for the years 1988 to 2003 were averaged.
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B.19 kR
[Dimensions] = funds that reach intended destination
total funds
= 1
Lacking any substantive information about terrorist funding, one can imagine just
how much is known about terrorist corruption. One can make some approximation as
follows: in normal militaries, roughly 15% of military spending is lost to corruption
(Gupta et al., 2000). However, normal militaries are subject to budgetary review by
some higher authority, whereas a guerrilla terrorist group like the LTTE is not. Indeed,
Stern (2003) notes that terrorist leaders often live in mansions, sparing no expense for
their own creature comforts even as their soldiers live from hand to mouth. Thus, one
might assume that corruption is twice as bad in a terrorist group as in a military. Thus,
kR = 1− .15 · 2.
B.20 kS
[Dimensions] = funds that reach intended destination
total funds
= 1
Although corruption is undoubtedly rampant in the Sri Lankan military, as it is in
militaries around the world, since the figures for cS and xS were calculated using actual
expenditure numbers and troop counts, it seems likely that the costs of corruption are
incorporated into the costs of outfitting and upkeep. Thus, kS = 1 to avoid double-
counting corruption.
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B.21 p
[Dimensions] = people
It was assumed that over the short term, the birth rate and death rate (most notably,
deaths from the war) would not amount to a very large overall change in the population.
Thus, p was taken as simply the 1990 population figure for Sri Lanka from the UN
Population Division’s Annual Estimates series of the U.N. Common Database (United
Nations Statistics Division, 2008).
B.22 qi
[Dimensions] = median income
GDP/capita
= 1
It was assumed that the median income of Sri Lanka did not vary overmuch from
1990 to 2006, an assumption probably foolish but nonetheless necessitated by the lack
of timely data. The median income earner’s income for 2006 was deflated to 1990 U.S.
dollars using consumer price index numbers for the Sri Lankan Rupee from the Colombo
Consumer Price Index (Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, 2008), and this
in turn was converted to U.S. dollars using the 1990 exchange rate from the Exchange
rate, national currency per US$, end of period (IMF) series from the U.N. Common
Database. Finally, this number was divided by Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP in 1990 U.S.
dollars as taken from the GDP per capita, current prices, US$ (UN estimates) series
from the U.N. Common Database.
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B.23 r
[Dimensions] = increase in GDP
current GDP
/year = 1
time
Constant price GDP growth rates for Sri Lanka for the years 1986 to 2005 were
drawn from the GDP annual growth rate, 1990 prices, US$ (UN estimates) series of the
U.N. Common Database (United Nations Statistics Division, 2008). Using the intensity
indicators from the Uppsalla Conflict Data Project (Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, Uppsala University, 2008), each year was classified as either a war year or
a peace year (either “No” or “Minor” in UCDP parlance was coded as peace). The
averages for the peace years was taken as r.
B.24 xS
[Dimensions] = upkeep cost
one existing soldier
= dollars
person
To calculate xS, a distinction had to be made somehow between the amount of
money spent on creating new units and maintaining units already in service. As spe-
cific data on the Sri Lankan military’s expenditure allocations could not be found, such
had to be constructed using data on the United States military and the Chinese mili-
tary. Using a 2007 military expenditure budget report (Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), 2006), expenditures on unit creation were distinguished from
expenditures on unit maintenance as follows: spending on the Reserve and the National
Guard was assumed to be training and thus creation, while all other personnel spend-
ing assumed to be salary and thus maintenance; Operations and Management, Military
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Construction, Family Housing, and Working Capital Funds were all classified as main-
tenance while procurement and RDT&E was classified as creation. From this, one can
calculate the percentage spent on creation versus maintenance.
Meanwhile, GlobalSecurity.org provides percentages of Chinese defense budget spend-
ing. Using the percentage of personnel spending that went into training in the U.S. case,
one can split the Chinese personnel spending up and combine the part approximated as
training expenses with the percent spent on Equipment for the total percentage spent
on creation, and similarly combine the rest of personnel spending with Maintenance of
Activities spending to approximate the total percentage spent on maintenance.
Averaging out the percentages calculated in the U.S. case with those calculated for
China (neither of which varied greatly from the other), one can calculate numbers for
percentage spent on maintenance versus percentage spent on creation hopefully general
to militaries across the world.
The approximated percentage spent on maintenance was multiplied by the total mil-
itary expenditure for each year from the SIPRI military expenditure database as scaled
to 1990 U.S. dollars by consumer price index numbers from the Consumer Price In-
dex, 2000 = 100 (IMF) table of the United Nations Common Database (United Nations
Statistics Division, 2008). The resulting amount spent on maintenance for each year
was divided by the number of troops in the Sri Lankan military for that year as reported
in the Armed forces, weapons holdings and employment in arms production table of the
Facts on International Relations and Security Trends database (International Relations
and Security Network and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008).
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The resulting average upkeep costs per soldier were averaged out for the final value of
xS.
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Appendix C
Testing Data
C.1 Armed Forces Personnel
Data for the size of Sri Lanka’s military for the beginning of each year from 1990 to
1995 were drawn from the Armed forces, weapons holdings and employment in arms
production table of the Facts on International Relations and Security Trends database
(International Relations and Security Network and Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute, 2008).
C.2 Gross Domestic Product
Data for Sri Lanka’s Gross Domestic Product for the beginning of each year from 1990
to 1995 were drawn from the GDP at market prices, 1990 prices, US$ (UN estimates)
series of the United Nations Common Database (United Nations Statistics Division,
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Year Armed Forces Personnel
1990 22000
1991 100000
1992 110000
1993 110000
1994 126000
1995 125000
Table C.1: State Troop Values
Year GDP (1990 US$)
1990 8,204,356,700
1991 8,599,884,900
1992 8,976,470,200
1993 9,597,247,500
1994 10,139,414,700
1995 10,700,060,200
Table C.2: GDP Values
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Year Deaths
1990 4500
1991 7252
1992 7253
1993 3000
1994 2000
Table C.3: Deaths (Yearly)
Year Cumulative Deaths
1990 0
1991 4500
1992 11752
1993 19005
1994 22005
1995 24005
Table C.4: Deaths (Cumulative)
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2008).
C.3 Deaths (Yearly)
Data for the number of people killed in the government versus Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam struggle for each year from 1990 to 1994 were drawn from the yearly
conflict deaths series of the Center for the Study of Civil War Battle Deaths Dataset
version 2.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).
C.4 Deaths (Cumulative)
Data for the cumulative number of people killed at the beginning of each year during
the 1990-1995 period were calculated from the numbers for yearly battle deaths (see
section C.3).
C.5 Civilian Cost Evaluation
This was calculated to be 20000 for the 1990-1994 period as follows: according to the
IPS-Inter Press Service (IPS-Inter Press Service, 1994), 30000 civilians were recorded
killed throughout the war at the end of 1994; according to the Sunday Herald (Skelton,
1990), 6000 civilians were killed during the tenure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force;
finally, according to United Press International (Athas, 1987), 4000 civilians were killed
before the Indian Peace Keeping Force. Thus, the number of civilians killed from 1900
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to 1994 equals 30000 - (6000 + 4000) = 20000. Note that this number is quite possibly
skewed rather high, as taking this number in combination with the total number killed
as calculated in Table C.4 implies that only 4005 combatants were killed during the
entire four years.
C.6 Outcome
Drawing on descriptions from (Keerawella and Samarajiva, 1994), (CanagaRetna, 1996),
and (Schaffer, 1995), one can form a qualitative conception of the war’s status from the
middle to the end of 1994.
Though the numbers above indicate that the Sri Lankan military grows steadily
during this period, one can conclude from Chandrika Kumaratunga’s electoral sweep on
a genuine peace platform indicates that the war had no end in site at the end of 1994.
Indeed, considering that the words “peace” or “reconciliation” with respect to Tamils
were always the rhetorical equivalent of self-impalement in Sri Lankan political history,
the war must have become truly brutal after the IPKF departed.
For their part, though the rebels had recently driven the army to its “most devas-
tating defeat” in 1993 (Keerawella and Samarajiva, 1994), they must have been facing
hard times and a prospect of war without end as well. Otherwise, they would not have
agreed to peace talks with the Kumaratunga administration - indeed, even if one as-
sumes they only acquiesced to negotiations so as to buy time to reload their weapons
(as certain elements in the military claimed from the very start of negotiations), that
still acknowledges that they needed time and were not exactly poised on the brink of
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overthrowing the government.
Thus, one would expect the following to be the qualitative state of the war at the
end of the period studied:
• No great change in relative strength
• No particularly “exciting” dynamics
• A long period of stagnation in the strength of both sides.
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